Aumann has proved that common knowledge of substantive rationality implies the backwards induction solution in games of perfect information. Stalnaker has proved that it does not. Roughly speaking, a player is substantively rational if, for all vertices v, if the player were to reach vertex v, then the player would be rational at vertex v". It is shown here that the key di erence between Aumann and Stalnaker lies in how they interpret this counterfactual. A formal model is presented that lets us capture this di erence, in which both Aumann's result and Stalnaker's result are true (under appropriate assumptions).
induction in games of perfect information. Startlingly di erent conclusions were reached by di erent authors.
These di erences were clearly brought out during a 2.5 hour round table discussion on \Common knowledge of rationality and the backward induction solution for games of perfect information" at the recent TARK (Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge) conference. During the discussion, Robert Aumann and Robert Stalnaker stated the following theorems:
Aumann's Theorem (informal version): Common knowledge of substantive rationality implies the backwards induction solution in games of perfect information.
Stalnaker's Theorem (informal version): Common knowledge of substantive rationality does not imply the backwards induction solution in games of perfect information.
The discussion during the round table was lively, but focused on more philosophical, high-level issues. My goal in this short note is to explain the technical di erences between the framework of Aumann and Stalnaker that lead to the di erent results. Aumann proves his theorem in Aumann 1995] . I show here what changes need to be made to Aumann's framework to get Stalnaker's result. 1 I believe that the points that I make here are well known to some (and certainly were made informally during the discussion). Nevertheless, there does not appear to be a careful comparison of the di erences between the models in the literature. I hope this note will help to clarify a few issues and put the debate on a more rational footing.
There are three terms in the theorems that need clari cation:
(common) knowledge rationality substantive rationality 1 The model that I use to prove Stalnaker's result is a variant of the model Stalnaker uses in Stalnaker 1996 ], designed to be as similar as possible to Aumann's model, to bring out the key di erences. This, I believe, is essentially the model that Stalnaker had in mind at the round table.
I claim that Stalnaker's result can be obtained using exactly the same definition of (common) knowledge and rationality as the one Aumann used in Aumann 1995] . The de nition of knowledge is the standard one, given in terms of partitions. (I stress this point because Stalnaker 1996] has argued that probability-1 belief is more appropriate than knowledge when considering games.) The de nition of rationality is that a player who uses strategy s is rational at vertex v if there is no other strategy that he knows will give him a better payo , conditional on being at vertex v. Both Aumann and Stalnaker give substantive rationality the same reading: \rationality at all vertices v in the game tree". They further agree that this involves a counterfactual statement: \for all vertices v, if the player were to reach vertex v, then the player would be rational at vertex v". The key di erence between Aumann and Stalnaker lies in how they interpret this counterfactual. In the rest of this note, I try to make this di erence more precise.
The Details I start by considering Aumann's model. Fix a game ? of perfect information for n players. As usual, we think of ? as a tree. Because ? is a game of perfect information, the players always know which vertex in the tree describes the current situation in the game. The nonleaf vertices in ? are partitioned into n sets, G 1 ; : : : ; G n , one for each player. The vertices in G i are said to belong to i; these are the ones where player i must move. A model of ? is a tuple ( ; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; s), where of states of the world, K 1 ; : : : ; K n are partitions, one for each player i = 1; : : : ; n (K i is i's information partition), and s maps each world ! 2 to a strategy pro le s(!) = (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ); s i is i's strategy in game ? at state !. As usual, a strategy for i in ? is just a mapping from i's vertices in ? to actions. I write s i (!) for s i .
Let K i (!) denote the cell in partition K i that includes !. De ne the operator K i on events as usual:
is the event that everyone (all the players) know E. Let CK(E) = A(E) \ A(A(E)) \ A(A(A(E))) \ : : :
CK(E) is the event that E is common knowledge.
Aumann and Stalnaker (and everyone else who has written on this subject that I am aware of) assume that the players know their strategies. Formally, that means that if ! 0 2 K i (!), then s i (!) = s i (! 0 ); that is, i uses the same strategy at all the states in a cell of K i .
Next we need to de ne rationality. Note that a strategy pro le s and vertex v uniquely determine a path in ? that would be followed if s were played starting at v. Let h v i (s) denote i's payo if this path is followed. Informally, i is rational at vertex v if there is no strategy that i could have used that i knows would net him a higher payo than the strategy he actually uses.
More precisely, i is rational at vertex v in ! if, for all strategies s i 6 = s i (!),
That is, i cannot do better by using s i than s i (!) against all the strategy pro les of the other players that he considers possible at !. This is a weak notion of rationality (which is certainly satis ed by expected utility maximization). By taking such a weak notion, Aumann's Theorem becomes stronger. As will be clear from the example, Stalnaker's Theorem holds even if we strengthen the requirements of rationality (to require strict inequality, for example).
Aumann then de nes substantive rationality to mean rationality at all vertices in the game tree. That is, i is substantively rational in state ! if i is rational at vertex v in ! for every vertex v 2 G i . For future reference, I call Aumann's notion of substantive rationality A-rationality.
Using these de nitions, Aumann can and does prove his theorem (using a straightforward backward induction argument).
Stalnaker's de nition of substantive rationality is di erent from Aumann's although, as I indicated above, he is trying to capture the same intuition.
His de nition tries to enforce the intuition that, for every vertex v 2 G i , if i were to actually reach v, then what he would do in that case would be rational. The key point is that, according to Stalnaker's de nition, in order to evaluate, at state !, whether i is being rational at vertex v by performing the action dictated by his strategy at !, we must consider i's beliefs in the state \closest" to ! according to i where v is actually reached.
To f is the unique selection function satisfying F1{F3. It is easy to check that, at ! 1 , it is common knowledge that strategy pro le s i is being used, for i = 1; 2. It is also common knowledge at ! 1 that, if vertex v 2 were reached, Bob would play down.
In this extended model, clearly Bob is not rational at vertex v 2 in ! 1 , since he plays down. This means that we do not have A-rationality at ! 1 (and, a fortiori, we do not have common knowledge of A-rationality at ! 1 ). On the other hand, Bob is rational at vertex v 2 in ! 2 , since Bob considers it possible that Alice may go down at v 3 (since K Bob (! 2 ) = f! 2 ; ! 3 g). Similarly, Alice is rational at vertex v 3 in ! 4 . Since f(! 1 ; v 2 ) = ! 2 and f(! 1 ; v 3 ) = ! 4 , it follows that we have S-rationality at ! 1 , and hence common knowledge of S-rationality at ! 1 .
This example is an instance of Stalnaker's Theorem: we have common knowledge of substantive rationality in the sense of S-rationality at ! 1 , yet the backward induction solution is not played at ! 1 . Nevertheless, it does not contradict Aumann's Theorem, since we do not have common knowledge of A-rationality.
With this machinery, we can now state Aumann's Theorem and Stalnaker's Theorem more formally. Let S-RAT consist of all states where all the players are S-rational; let A-RAT consist of all states where all the players are A-rational; let BI consist of all states where the backward induction solution is played. Note that, in an extended model of the Ann-Bob game, it is consistent for Ann to say \Although it is common knowledge that I would play across if v 3 were reached, if I were to play across at v 1 , Bob would consider it possible that I would play down at v 3 ." This is not possible in Aumann's framework because, without selection functions, Aumann has no way of allowing the agents to revise their beliefs. (This point is essentially made by Samet 1996] .) In the de nition of A-rationality, for any vertex v, player i's beliefs in state ! about the possible strategies player j may be using if vertex v is reached are the same (and are determined by K i (!)). It is crucial for Aumann's result (and, I believe, a weakness in his model) that players do not (and cannot) revise their beliefs about other player's strategies when doing such hypothetical reasoning.
It is not hard to place a condition on selection functions that guarantees that players beliefs about other player's strategies do not change whatever vertex they may be in. basically mimics Aumann's proof of his theorem, since F1{F4 essentially gives us his framework. I rst recall a standard characterization of common knowledge. De ne the notion of omega 00 being reachable from ! 0 in k steps inductively: ! 00 is reachable from ! 0 in 1 step i ! 00 2 K i (! 0 ) for some i 2 f1; : : : ; ng; ! 00 is reachable from ! 0 in k + 1 steps i there exists a state ! 000 that is reachable from ! 0 in 1 step such that ! 00 is reachable from ! 000 in k steps. We say that ! 00 is reachable from ! 0 if ! 00 is reachable from ! 0 in k steps for some k. It is well known Aumann 1976 ] that ! 0 2 CK(E) i ! 00 2 E for all ! 00 reachable from ! 0 .
I show by induction on k that for all states ! 0 reachable from !, if v is a vertex which is at height k in the game tree (i.e., k moves away from a leaf), the move dictated by the backward induction solution (for the subgame of ? rooted at v) is played at v in state ! 0 .
For the base case, suppose v is at height 1 and ! 0 is reachable from !.
Since ! 2 CK(S-RAT), we must have ! 0 2 S-RAT. Suppose player i moves at ! 0 . Since ! 0 2 S-RAT, player i must make the move dictated by the backwards induction solution at f(! 0 ; v). By F3, he must do so at ! 0 as well. For the inductive step, suppose that v is at height k + 1, player i moves at v, and ! 0 is reachable from !. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that a is the action indicated by the backward induction solution at v but s i (! 0 )(v) = a 0 6 = a. Note that by the induction hypothesis, at every vertex below v, all the players play according to the backward induction solution in state ! 0 .
Since ! 0 2 S-RAT, we must have that i is rational at v in f(! 0 ; v). By F3, it follows that i plays a 0 at vertex v in f(! 0 ; v) and at every vertex below v, the players play according to the backward induction solution. Thus, there must be a state ! 00 2 K i (f(! 0 ; v)) such that by using s i (f(! 0 ; v)), player i does at least as well in ! 00 as by using the backward induction strategy starting from v. By F4, there must exist some ! 000 2 K i (! 0 ) such that s(! 00 ) and s(! 000 ) agree on the subtree of ? below v. Since ! 000 is reachable from !, by the induction hypothesis, all players use the backward induction solution at vertices below v. By F3, this is true at ! 00 as well. However, this means that player i does better at ! 00 playing a at v than a 0 , giving us the desired contradiction.
For the second half, given a nondegenerate game ? of perfect information, let s be the strategy where, at each vertex v, the players play the move dictated the backward induction solution in the game de ned by the subtree below v. Or perhaps it should be \given her current beliefs (regarding, for example, what move Bob will make), if v 3 is reached, Alice will play a". Or perhaps it should be \in the state`closest' to the current state where v 3 is actually reached, Alice plays a". I have taken the last reading here (where`closest' is de ned by the selection function); assumption F3 essentially forces it to be equivalent to the second reading.
However, without F4, this equivalence is not maintained with regard to Bob's beliefs. That is, consider the following two statements:
Bob currently believes that, given Alice's current beliefs, Alice will play a if v 3 is reached; in the state closest to the current state where v 3 is reached, Bob believes that Alice plays a at v 3 . The rst statement considers Bob's beliefs at the current state; the second considers Bob's beliefs at a di erent state. Without F4, these beliefs might be quite di erent. It is this possible di erence that leads to Stalnaker's Theorem.
Strategies themselves clearly involve counterfactual reasoning. If we take strategies as primitive objects (as both Aumann and Stalnaker do, and as I have done for consistency), we have two sources of counterfactuals in extended models: selection functions and strategies. Stalnaker 1996, p. 135] has argued that \To clarify the causal and epistemic concepts that interact in strategic reasoning, it is useful to break them down into their component parts." This suggests that it would be useful to have a model where strategy is not a primitive, but rather is de ned in terms of counterfactuals. This is precisely what Samet 1996] does.
Not surprisingly, in Samet's framework, Aumann's Theorem does not hold without further assumptions. Samet shows that what he calls a common hypothesis of rationality implies the backward induction solution in nondegenerate games of perfect information. Although there are a number of technical di erences in the setup, this result is very much in the spirit of Theorem 1.
